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ABSTRACT:
Persistent gaps in American intellectual property law and federal cultural resource
legislation leave intangible Native American cultural resources almost wholly
unprotected against unauthorized commercial appropriation. The results of this
oversight are clear: Cultural appropriation remains both profitable and legally
permissible, and Native communities have little remedy against outside
appropriators. Inspired by a series of interviews conducted by the author with Alaska
Native artists and allies, this article proposes a partial, state-based solution to the
problem of unauthorized commercialization: the right of publicity. Building from
previous scholarship on the potential and pitfalls of a common law, right-of-publicity
shield to cultural appropriation, it focuses on the relatively-unexplored option of a
statutory right, which can be passed by individual states and tailored to grant tribes
a communal remedy for unauthorized commercialization. A well-crafted right-ofpublicity statute would provide a valuable opportunity for state courts to recognize
and defer to tribal law and custom. Most importantly, the right of publicity could
provide legal remedy to Native communities where no remedy currently exists and
meet an urgent need for protection against further exploitation of Native cultural
heritage.
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LIVING HERITAGE, STOLEN MEANING: PROTECTING INTANGIBLE NATIVE
AMERICAN CULTURAL RESOURCES THROUGH THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
SHANNON PRICE*
“Good artists copy. Great artists steal.”
-Attributed to Pablo Picasso
“Sometimes, all we have is our name.”
-Melissa Shaginoff, Curator of Contemporary Indigenous Art and Culture at the
Anchorage Museum and Member of the Ahtna / Paiute tribe
I. INTRODUCTION
Pablo Picasso’s oft-quoted maxim—“Good artists copy. Great artists steal.”—
is so thoroughly absorbed into Western understandings of art and cultural
development that, ironically enough, we don’t even know whether Picasso was the
first one who said it.1 As long as the ‘stealing’ is legally permissible, Americans
typically regard “cross-cultural borrowing” not only as “inevitable . . . but also as vital
to internal cultural growth and mutual cultural tolerance and understanding.”2 But
this attitude (much like Picasso himself) is arrogant. It ignores a long history of
cultural imperialism and theft imposed by Westerners on indigenous peoples—and it
enables continuing harm to those peoples today.
Appropriation of Native American cultural resources in the United States is
ongoing, multi-faceted, and deeply harmful to Native American communities. Largescale examples of this kind of appropriation include use of a sacred Navajo song into
OutKast’s “Hey Ya!” performance at the 2004 Grammy Awards,3 incorporation of
Native Hawaiian mele inoa (sacred name chants) in copyrighted Disney music,4 and
even the marketing and sale of “Crazy Horse Malt Liquor.”5 For Native communities,
lost control over cultural resources can be devastating. Centuries-old traditions,
*
Shannon Price, J.D., is a 2020 graduate of Yale Law School with previous publications
including: Shannon Price, Remembering the CLASSICS: Impact of the CLASSICs Act on Memory
Institutions, Orphan Works, and Mass Digitization, 26 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 80–113 (2019); John
Fabian Witt, Ryan Martins, and Shannon Price, Contract’s Revenge: The Waiver Society and the
Death of Tort, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
1 See Quoteresearch, Good Artists Copy; Great Artists Steal, THE QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (2013),
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/03/06/artists-steal/.
2 David Howes, Combating Cultural Appropriation in the American Southwest: Lessons from the
Hopi Experience Concerning the Uses of Law, 10 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 129, 150 (1995).
3 Angela R. Riley, Straight Stealing: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property
Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 70–72 (2005).
4 Nina Mantilla, The New Hawaiian Model: The Native Hawaiian Cultural Trademark
Movement and the Quest for Intellectual Property Rights to Protect and Preserve Native Hawaiian
Culture, 3 INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 26, 27 (2011).
5 Jessica R. Herrera, Not Even His Name: Is the Denigration of Crazy Horse Custer's Final
Revenge, 29 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 175, 176 (1994).
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when sold and/or stolen, “become decontextualized, their meaning drained, and their
value to the Native culture eroded.”6 Protection of cultural resources is recognized by
scholars and tribes as “essential to the survival of Indian Nations as distinctive
cultural and political groups.”7
Existing forms of American intellectual property and cultural resource
protection, including federal intellectual property laws, the Native American Graves
and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA), are
demonstrably
inadequate
to
address
unauthorized
appropriation
and
commercialization of Native American cultural resources.8 Although these laws
provide some protection to tangible cultural resources, they fail to protect intangible
resources, including Native “songs, rituals, ceremonies, dance, traditional knowledge,
art, customs, and spiritual beliefs.”9 Even copyright law, the go-to avenue for
protection of intangible intellectual property, requires that an “original work of
authorship” be “fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression.”10 Historic resources,
passed down through the generations, are not ‘original.’ Copyright jurisprudence
does not recognize communal authorship,11 nor the fact that “some forms of artistic
expression may not be nor were ever intended to be set down in a fixed medium.”12 As
a result, “[t]he very nature of Native artistic expression—works that are created
intergenerationally, built upon fluid conceptions of revision and creativity, and
seldom recorded in a tangible medium (notwithstanding the collective memory of its
peoples)—precludes copyright protection.”13
This Article proposes a partial, state-based solution to one facet of the
appropriation problem. Specifically, it asserts that the right of publicity could provide
a legal remedy for tribes faced with unauthorized commercialization of their
intangible cultural resources. Some scholars have already identified the common law
right of publicity as an avenue to protect Native American cultural property.14
However, the limited scope of the common law right of publicity—which is typically
reserved for individual celebrities—presents sufficient challenges to this avenue that
it has been little-discussed in recent literature.15 This Article, in contrast, proposes a
statutory right of publicity, which can be passed by individual states and tailored to
grant tribes a communal remedy for unauthorized commercialization.
From the outset, it is vital to recognize a major limitation of this Article. As a
white woman of primarily European descent, I have never personally experienced the
6 Stephen D. Osborne, Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization, 28 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 203, 214 (2003).
7 Rebecca Tsosie, ReClaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and Cultural
Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 300 (2002).
8 See, e.g., Howes, supra note 2; Riley, supra note 3; Osborne, supra note 6.
9 Riley, supra note 3, at 77.
10 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2020).
11 Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 184 (2000).
12 Jill Koren Kelley, Owning the Sun: Can Native Culture Be Protected through Current
Intellectual Property Law, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 180, 187 (2007).
13 Riley, supra note 11, at 186.
14 See, e.g., Herrera, supra note 5, at 189–193.
15 See Sarah La Voi, Cultural Heritage Tug of War: Balancing Preservation Interests and
Commercial Rights, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 875, 898–907 (2003).
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harm of cultural appropriation. I have attempted throughout the Article to defer to
the voices of those who have—and especially to the Alaska Native artists and
activists who were generous enough to speak with me during the 2019 trip to Alaska
that serves as the foundation of this project.16 Even so, my account of these issues
will inevitably fall short of what can be learned from the Native American
communities and allies who have actively fought against appropriation for decades.
Beyond a proposal to better leverage the right of publicity for Native communities,
this paper is intended to serve as a reminder that cultural appropriation is not a
creature of the past. It is a present, ongoing harm, to which Native communities
continue to propose a variety of innovative and workable solutions.
II. CULTURAL APPROPRIATION AS AN EXERCISE OF POWER
Before jumping into a proposal for a legal method to combat cultural
appropriation, it is essential to engage with two questions. First, what is cultural
appropriation? And second, how does cultural appropriation harm the individuals
and communities whose culture is being appropriated? Inevitably, commentators
disparaging cultural appropriation claims will assert that appropriation is no more
than the exercise of artistic freedom, “cross-cultural borrowing” that imposes no ‘real’
damage on the (often unwilling) borrowees.17 At best, such a definition is ignorant. At
worst, it actively enables continued harm to indigenous communities, for whom the
maintenance of cultural resources and sovereignty is critical to survival.18
Cultural appropriation is broadly defined as the taking of intellectual
property, cultural artifacts or expressions, and other forms of heritage from a culture
that is not one’s own.19 Dr. Alan Boraas, a professor of anthropology at Kenai
Peninsula College and honorary member of the Kenaitze Indian Tribe, adds that
appropriation most often involves “taking symbols that represent the interest of a
culture, redefining them, and giving them new meaning—and therefore
marginalizing their original meaning.”20 What it means to ‘take’ a piece of cultural
heritage can be difficult for outsiders to comprehend, and not all cultural
appropriation is intentional. Instead, appropriation “becomes an issue when an artist
or a writer or whoever . . . take[s] things and images that have one context to
indigenous people and use[s] that context” for their own purposes, in the process

16 In August 2019, I was fortunate enough to travel to Anchorage, Alaska and meet with a
variety of Alaska Native artists, scholars, and allies. Although I have not been able to include direct
quotations from every individual I met with in this Article, I am deeply grateful for the many people
who shared their time and expertise, and I have tried to reflect the breadth and richness of their
comments here. Special thanks goes to Dawn Biddison, Dr. Alan Boraas, Professor Angela Demma,
Sonya Kelliher-Combs, Dr. Paul Ongtooguk, Melissa Shaginoff, Professor Gerald Torres, and Dr.
Rosita Worl.
17 Howes, supra note 2, at 150.
18 Rebecca Tsosie, Just Governance Or Just War: Native Artists, Cultural Production, and the
Challenge of Super-Diversity, 6 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 56, 96 (2015).
19 Tsosie, supra note 7, at 300.
20 Phone Interview with Dr. Alan Boraas, Professor of Anthropology at Kenai Peninsula College,
in New Haven, Conn. (Sept. 16, 2019).
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“marinaliz[ing] the people for whom the [original] meaning is very dear and
important.”21
Lurking beneath the act of ‘taking’ a piece of cultural heritage is an assertion
about the relationship between appropriator and appropriatee—specifically, an
assertion about who gets to dictate norms and meaning, and who does not. As
Melissa Shaginoff, Curator of Contemporary Indigenous Art and Culture at the
Anchorage Museum and a member of the Ahtna / Paiute tribe, explains: “Cultural
appropriation is about power. It’s about who has the power, who has the influence,
and the ability to decide what parts of the culture they want to represent and
reflect.”22 Appropriation involves “taking a bit of somebody’s identity and using it to
tell a different story.”23 By telling their own, different story, the appropriator asserts
power over the original story and the community from which it came. Even a naive
appropriator, Dr. Boraas states, is claiming a form of “control[] . . . essentially saying,
we can change your story, we change the meaning of your images, and you can’t do
anything about it.”24 Dr. Paul Ongtogook, Director of Alaska Native Studies at the
University of Alaska Anchorage and an Inupiat elder, goes a step further, describing
Western systems of resource exploitation—cultural resources included—as “stripmining, at a pace that is just stunning.”25 Cultural appropriation is, in essence, a
mechanism through which outsiders strip-mine away the heritage of indigenous
communities, placing an immense burden on those communities to reassert control
and keep their cultural heritage intact.
The harms of cultural appropriation are complex and multi-faceted. In my
interviews and research, three harms—articulated here by Alaska Native
communities—stand out. First, and perhaps easiest for Western legal systems to
understand, cultural appropriation creates economic harm. Commercial exploitation
of cultural heritage by outsiders dilutes the market for authentic uses, as when a
non-native artist’s rendition of an Alaska Native design occupies gallery space that
otherwise would be granted to an Alaska Native artist. This scenario not only limits
the ability of the Alaska Native artist to commercially benefit from her rightful
heritage, but according to Melissa Shaginoff, also “adds to that mystical element:
that indigenous people are not real, not creating work.”26 In an intellectual property
system that privileges first publication, the tendency of outsiders to seize and
commercialize pieces of cultural heritage that they ‘discover’ also creates perverse
incentives for native communities to withhold their knowledge. As Dr. Ongtogook
explains: “If we put our knowledge out there, some scientist is going to make it their
discovery. Someone will get a PhD out of it, or a tenure track publication, or it will
get copyrighted.”27 Once the knowledge is published and/or copyrighted by an

Id.
Interview with Melissa Shaginoff, Curator of Contemporary Indigenous Art and Culture at
the Anchorage Museum, in Anchorage, Alaska (Aug. 20, 2019).
23 Id.
24 Boraas, supra note 20.
25 Interview with Dr. Paul Ongtogook, Director of Alaska Native Studies at the University of
Alaska, in Anchorage, Alaska (Aug. 19, 2019).
26 Shaginoff, supra note 22.
27 Ongtogook, supra note 25.
21
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outsider, its potential economic value to the tribe can be severely eroded, if not
entirely eliminated.
Second, by trivializing and misrepresenting cultural heritage, cultural
appropriation functions to erase both the heritage and the communities to whom that
it belongs. Ted Mayac Sr., a member of the King Island Iñupiaq community,
described this harm vividly in the essay: “How it Feels to Have Your History
Stolen.”28 Mayac wrote his essay in response to “King Island Christmas,” a 1997
oratorio still performed across the country today.29 For Mayac, the oratorio caused
“lasting and unforgettable” damage stemming from the fact that his community had
“been cast in a false light, misrepresented, and arbitrarily characterized without
permission and agreement.”30 The oratorio ascribed several customs and practices to
the King Island Iñupiaq that actually belonged to other Alaska Native tribes,
“cast[ing] the islanders as usurpers of other tribes’ practices and customs.”31 By
lumping the heritage of Alaska Native tribes together, it obscured the actual heritage
of the King Island people, including their continued existence as a culturally distinct,
living community. The myth of a dead or monolithic Alaska Native culture—the
“quote unquote Eskimo experience,” Melissa Shaginoff calls it—is both a product and
an enabler of cultural appropriation.32 As Dr. Boraas notes: “If [an appropriator] can
create the mythology of there are no Natives here, or there were no Natives here,
then [he] can feel good about what [he has] done.”33 That appropriator can also ignore
the centuries that Alaska Native communities struggled to preserve their distinct
heritage against legal and religious oppression, only to see that same heritage
mutilated by a children’s musical.
Finally, by removing cultural heritage from its context and commercializing
it for an audience largely ignorant of its origins, cultural appropriation encourages
the fetishization of native cultures. This effect of appropriation is eloquently
articulated by Tlingit and Unangax̂ artist Nicholas Galanin in his 2012 work “I
Looooove Your Culture! Fine Wood Working.” The work is a small, wooden carving
modeled after a sex toy called a “pocket pussy.”34 Galanin often displays it alongside
a white performer, who sits in the gallery and carves a duplicate.35 The message is
clear: commercial reproduction of Alaska Native cultural objects for white
consumption is equated with “a dehumanizing masturbatory tool.”36 Romanticization
28 TED MAYAC SR., HOW IT FEELS TO HAVE YOUR HISTORY STOLEN, in THE ALASKA NATIVE
READER (Maria Sháa Tláa Williams ed., 2009).
29 Theatrical
groups interested in performing the oratio can obtain a license at
http://kingislandchristmas.com/to-obtain-a-license/.
30 MAYAC SR., supra note 28.
31 Id.
32 Shaginoff, supra note 22.
33 Boraas, supra note 20.
34 Sheila Regan, Nicholas Galanin Suggests We’re Ready to Fight Back, HYPERALLERGIC (Nov.
18,
2019),
https://hyperallergic.com/520552/nicholas-galanin-law-warschaw-gallery-macalestercollege/.
35 Id. See also Jillian Steinhauer, Nicholas Galanin remixes Native American identity at
Phoenix’s
Heard
Museum,
THE ART NEWSPAPER
(Aug.
6,
2018,
22:05
BST),
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/review/nicholas-galanin-remixes-native-american-identity-atphoenix-s-heard-museum.
36 Regan, supra note 34.
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and reproduction of Native culture without regard for living Native communities
reduces that culture to decontextualized objects—objects that are no more respected,
for Galanin, than sexual objects. Galanin’s commentary is especially poignant when
viewed in the context of the scantily-clad dancers in Native American headdresses
who performed at the 2004 Grammys,37 or the countless “Sexy Indian” costumes sold
each year at Halloween (some even referencing specific tribes).38 Appropriation and
fetishization work hand-in-hand, with one justifying and encouraging the other.
Understanding cultural appropriation as an exercise of power helps to
explain not only what cultural appropriation is, but what it is not. Dr. Rosita Worl,
president of the Sealaska Heritage Institute and a member of the Tlingit people,
recalls an incident in which non-Native art instructors responded to a cultural
appropriation scandal in Juneau by becoming “fearful of teaching Native art.”39 This
fear, Dr. Worl explains, was unfounded, because “Indigineous Peoples had gained the
means to pay [non-Native teachers] to learn about our native arts . . . [and so] we had
the right to give them permission to teach Native art in schools . . . [where we] lacked
Native art teachers.”40 In this instance, the non-Native instructors were clearly not
engaging in cultural appropriation, because they were not asserting power over
heritage that was not their own. Far from it: By teaching Native art with the explicit
permission and encouragement of the Native community, the non-Native instructors
were actually affirming Native power and control over Native cultural resources.
No one proposal can seriously contend the ability to address all forms of
cultural appropriation. By its nature, cultural appropriation is often unintentional,
subtle to outsiders, and heavily contextualized. To eliminate it may be impossible, or
at least require heavy censorship—and censorship is not the goal of this author nor
any of the Alaska Native individuals with whom I spoke. Instead, this Article
attempts to develop a legal tool targeting one of the most clear-cut and harmful forms
of appropriation: when outsiders knowingly take and exploit cultural heritage for
purposes of commercial gain. As the law currently stands, tribes have little to no
legal mechanism for combatting even this egregious form of appropriation. This
status quo is wrong. Cultural appropriation causes real, legally cognizable harm to
native communities. Those communities should have legal remedy.
III. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: A GAP IN LEGAL PROTECTION FOR INTANGIBLE CULTURAL
RESOURCES
Existing protections for Native American cultural resources break down into
two categories. First, we have legislation passed specifically to deal with Indian art,
artifacts, and other material objects of cultural significance. The most relevant
examples are the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
Riley, supra note 3, at 70–71.
See,
e.g.,
Sexy
Indian
Costumes,
COSTUME
SUPER
CENTER,
https://www.costumesupercenter.com/categories/sexy-historical-indians (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
39 Written Interview with Dr. Rosita Worl, President of the Sealaska Heritage Institute,
conducted remotely from Chapel Hill, North Carolina (July 30, 2019).
40 Id.
37
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(NAGPRA) and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA). Second, we have the
intellectual property regimes, including copyright, patent, and trademark law.
Neither of these categories of protection currently reaches unfixed and intangible
cultural resources.41 Moreover, both categories fail to recognize any legal interest for
Native communities in preventing commercialization altogether—an ability critical
to the maintenance of cultural sovereignty.42
A. Specific Legislative Protection for Native American Cultural Resources: NAGPRA
and IACA
The history of legislative protection for Native American cultural resources in
the United States generally evinces a “callous disregard for the property, history and
culture” of Native peoples.43 The first (and until 1966, the only44) federal remedy
available for tribes faced with looting and unauthorized excavation of their land was
the 1906 Antiquities Act, which forbid the taking of “objects of antiquity” from federal
lands without a government-issued permit.45 In 1974, the Act was ruled
unconstitutional for vagueness by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which noted
that despite the 68 years that had passed since the legislation’s enactment, “[c]ounsel
on neither side was able to cite an instance prior to this in which conviction under
the statute was sought by the United States.”46 The Antiquities Act remains
significant as the source of the President’s power to declare and protect National
Monuments,47 but plays little role in modern protection of Native American cultural
resources. The website for the National Park Service, for example, praises the act’s
“support for the care and management of archeological sites, collections, and
information” without ever mentioning Indian land, laws, or artifacts.48
Worse, the Antiquities Act not only failed to stem the tide of Indian artifacts
and remains being removed from Indian land, but in many cases enabled it. By
classifying “objects of antiquity” as federal property that could be excavated by
permit, the Antiquities Act undercut Indian claims to excavation sites and artifacts
and created a direct pipeline for Indian remains and cultural patrimony to the
Riley, supra note 3, at 79.
See Tsosie, supra note 7, at 304–310.
43 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278,
297 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cudahy, J., concurring).
44 See Marilyn Phelan, A History and Analysis of Laws Protecting Native American Cultures, 45
TULSA L. REV. 45, 50–51 (2009) (In 1966, the National Historic Preservation Act became the second
piece of legislation to offer protection to Native American cultural property.).
45 Antiquities Act, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433
(2020)). See also Phelan, supra note 44, at 49.
46 United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 114 (9th Cir. 1974).
47 The Act has been applied primarily to grant Presidents the power to declare national
monuments. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service, Antiquities Act: Scope of Authority for
Modification
of
National
Monuments
(2016),
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.crs/crsmthmavyx0001&i=3.
48 See National Park Service: U.S. Department of the Interior, American Antiquities Act of 1906:
Overview, NPS, https://www.nps.gov/articles/american-antiquities-act-of-1906.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2020).
41
42
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nation’s largest private and public museums.49 Subsequent federal legislation,
including the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1978, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979,
continued to assert federal ownership over Indian artifacts (including ancient
remains) and provided no mechanism for repatriation.50 State looting laws were
under-enforced; state repatriation laws were rare.51 In 1987, the U.S. General
Accounting Office reported that “nearly 44,000 of the 136,000 archaeological sites in
the Four Corners states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah had experienced
looting of Indian artifacts and cultural property.”52 By 1987, the Smithsonian
Institution held the remains of 18,584 American Indians.53
Passed in 1990, the Native American Graves and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA) is primarily a piece of human rights legislation. It was “designed to
address the flagrant violation of the ‘civil rights of America's first citizens . . . [and
viewed by the government] as a part of its trust responsibility to Indian tribes and
people.’”54 NAGPRA has three main functions. First, it establishes a system of
statutory priority governing ownership of Native American cultural items discovered
on federal land after 1990, assuring that lineal descendents (if they exist) and tribes
(if they do not) will have first claim to new discoveries.55 Second, it prohibits
trafficking in Native American remains and cultural items acquired in violation of
the act, regardless of when and where they were obtained.56 Finally, it provides for a
system of inventory and repatriation of Native American remains and other cultural
patrimony in museum collections, with different requirements depending on the
object in question and funding status of the museum.57
For many observers, NAGRPA represented a long-overdue “consensus . . .
[that the] sacred culture of Native Americans and Native Hawaiians is a living
heritage”—a heritage that must be respected as more than a “remnant museum
specimen.”58 However, the law provides little assistance to Native communities
outside the realm of material artifacts and remains. Even beyond NAGPRA’s
“onerous requirements to validate . . . ownership,” Dr. Worl emphasizes that the Act
provides no protection for “the intangible attributes of sacred objects.”59 An
individual that removed funerary objects from Indian land without permission would
be liable under NAGPRA.60 An individual that recorded a performance of a
49 Steven J. Gunn, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act at Twenty:
Reaching the Limits Is Our National Consensus, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 503, 509–512 (2010).
50 Id. at 511.
51 Id. at 512.
52 Id. at 511 (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Cultural Resources: Problems Protecting and
Preserving Federal Archaeological Resources, No. RCED-88-3, 22 (1987)).
53 Id. at 508.
54 Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 59–60 (1992).
55 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2020).
56 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2020).
57 Id.
58 RENNARD STRICKLAND, TONTO’S REVENGE: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE AND
POLICY 85-86 (1997).
59 Worl, supra note 39.
60 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2020); 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2020).
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ceremonial dance on Indian land without permission—even if he sold and profited
from the recording—would not.61 In the age of the Internet, stolen cultural resources
can be exposed to the world in a matter of moments.62 The resulting harm to the
community can never be undone: an intangible resource cannot be repatriated.
While NAGPRA governs trade and repatriation of certain Native American
artifacts, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 (IACA) protects the market for art
and crafts produced for sale by Indian artisans. IACA is often characterized as a
“truth-in-advertising” law that attaches fines and potential jail time to the display
and sale of items falsely (and knowingly) identified as “Indian produced.” On its face,
IACA “protect[s] market share, not tribal identity, through preventing the flooding of
the market with fake products.”63 In action, however, IACA grants significant
authority to federally recognized tribes to assert, via membership and certification
criteria, what an authentic ‘Indian’ product is.64
Commentators disagree on IACA’s effectiveness. Some have asserted that
IACA’s non-definition of “Indian products” creates a valuable opportunity to expand
the Act’s reach beyond “art and crafts in the literal sense.”65 Others have highlighted
IACA’s deference to tribal membership and certification criteria as a valuable grant
of “economic and cultural protection.”66 IACA can be understood as “creat[ing] a kind
of property right“ in ‘authentic’ Indian identity, which can then be leveraged to profit
from ‘authentic’ Indian products.67 But this property right is only as useful as it is
enforceable; Dr. Worl considers IACA wholly ineffective for protecting cultural
resources because “enforcement by the federal government is near non-existent and
the penalties do not deter repeat offenders.68
Even if NAGPRA and IACA were interpreted and enforced in the manner
most beneficial to Native communities, an enormous gap would still exist in the law
for protection of intangible Native American cultural resources. The two acts “extend
no protection to non-material cultural resources such as stories or ceremonies.”69
Despite its strong trade and repatriation requirements for tangible artifacts and
remains, NAGPRA offers no remedy for appropriation of intangible resources. IACA
protects the commercial value of ‘authentic’ Indian products by excluding imitators
from the market, but offers no mechanism to keep cultural resources out of the
market in the first place. The exclusively materialistic orientation of both laws leaves
intangible resources wholly unprotected, making intellectual property law the only
remaining avenue for tribes seeking to prevent appropriation.70

25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2020).
Riley, supra note 3, at 79.
63 Osborne, supra note 6, at 221.
64 Id.
65 Richard A. Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 111, 136 (1996).
66 Osborne, supra note 6, at 222.
67 William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1027 (2001).
68 Worl, supra note 39. See also William J. Hapiuk, Jr., supra note 67, at 1027.
69 Osborne, supra note 6, at 209.
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B. Failure of Intellectual Property to Protect Native American Cultural Resources
The lack of federal legislation specifically addressing Native American
intangible cultural resources does not leave such resources entirely unprotected:
instead, “Native Americans can and do use patent, trademark, and copyright laws to
protect their intellectual property.”71 Like existing Native American cultural resource
legislation, however, American intellectual property regimes fail to recognize Native
American interests in preventing unauthorized commercialization. Lack of
recognition for unfixed and/or communal resources means that these regimes—in
their current form, at least—will inevitably fall short of providing adequate
protection for Native American communities.
At their core, United States intellectual property regimes are “designed to
help individual authors profit, not to help collective cultures survive and develop.”72
Courts have been adamant in their “conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’'”73 In most cases, American IP
law does not concern itself with the personality interests, or “creative soul,” of an
artist or work.74 Instead, United States intellectual property regimes are shaped and
directed toward the ultimate end of providing economic “rewards commensurate with
the services rendered.”75
A conflict immediately arises between the goals and assumptions of United
States intellectual property law and the nature of the intangible resources that tribes
often seek to protect. Typical Western focus on “the lone originator, the free agent,
the creative genius often conflicts with the more communal focus of native peoples, in
which identity and rights derive from membership in clan, kinship and tribal
networks.”76 Copyright law, for example, protects “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression.”77 It envisions artistic expression as the
product of a lone, profit-motivated creator and uses a limited-duration monopoly to
incentivize creative production. American copyright law does not recognize the fact
that “some forms of artistic expression may not be nor were ever intended to be set
down in a fixed medium.”78 It does not distinguish between works that entered the
public domain after purposeful commercial exploitation by their creators and works
that were recorded, shared, or published without their creators’ consent.79 This
reality is painfully apparent for indigenous artists such Ami elder Lifvon Guo, whose
performance of the Ami Song of Joy was digitally incorporated into Enigma’s 1994
Osborne, supra note 6, at 223.
Osborne, supra note 6, at 209.
73 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
74 Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795,
801 (2001).
75 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
76 Osborne, supra note 6, at 223.
77 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2020).
78 Kelley, supra note 12, at 187.
79 Id. at 188 (Kelley in particular notes the long history of “explorers, missionaries,
anthropologists and scientists [who] have documented various types of indigenous cultural life,
including art mediums, medicines and sacred rituals.”).
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hit, Return to Innocence.80 Lifvon Guo’s performance of Song of Joy was recorded and
incorporated in Return to Innocence entirely without his (or the Ami’s) knowledge,
but the song itself is a communally created chant passed down by the Ami for
generations.81 As a consequence, Guo and the Ami have no power “determine the fate
of the recordings, reap the rewards of their own creation, or control resulting
violations of tribal law and blatant distortions of their work.”82 So far as indigenous
cultural resources remain intangible, unfixed, or communally owned, no copyright
protection is available.
Patent and trademark protection for Native American cultural resources
suffer a similar fate to copyright. The novelty requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 102 means
that “patenting [for] centuries-old cultural knowledge is unavailable.”83 Time bars for
public use deny patent protection to techniques and practices “considered new by the
larger world, yet long used within the confines of" Native American communities.84
The utility of trademark protection for tribes is likewise limited by “its commercial
basis and focus.”85 To bring a trademark claim, “a party must be a competitor in the
market.”86 Native communities that wish to keep intangible cultural resources out of
the market are left with self-contradictory claims: they are asked to demonstrate
commercial harm when the real harm felt is commercialization itself. Their primary
remedy has been to petition the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), challenging the registrability of an appropriated mark rather than its
actual use.87 Even when a tribe is victorious before the USPTO, however, an
appropriator need not stop using the now-unprotected mark: the Washington
Redskins, for example, continued to sell Redskins gear for years despite cancellation
of their trademarks in 2014 as “disparaging to Native Americans.”88
Through its focus on the commercialization of fixed, tangible works, “the
American legal system has bifurcated Native claims . . . negat[ing] the cultural value
of resources to Native people.”89 As the examples above—along with countless
others—illustrate, intangible cultural resources are no less vulnerable to

Riley, supra note 11, at 176.
Id. at 176.
82 Id. at 177.
83 Kelley, supra note 12, at 187.
84 Kelley, supra note 12, at 187 (quoting Michael Elkind, The Culturla Dimensions of Patents,
Intellectual Property Today, Aug. 1996, at 26).
85 Osborne, supra note 6, at 226.
86 Osborne, supra note 6, at 226.
87 For an example of a successful trademark challenge, see Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999). For further discussion of the case, see La Voi, supra note 15,
at 882–884.
88 See Michele Riley, Hail to the . . . Redskins? How the TTAB’s Cancellation of a Historic Mark
Impacts
Brand
Value
and
the
NFL,
STOUT
(Sept.
1,
2014),
https://www.stout.com/en/insights/article/hail-the-redskins-how-ttabs-cancellation-historic-markimpacts-brand-value-and-nfl/. See Lee Carpenter, Washington’s NFL team to retire Redskins name,
following sponsor pressure and calls for change, WASHINGTON POST (July 13, 2020, 2:48 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/07/13/redskins-change-name-announcement/.
UPDATE: This article was written prior to the Wasington Football Team’s decision to retire the
Redskins name.
89 Tsosie, supra note 7, at 306.
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appropriation than tangible cultural resources.90 By privileging the tangible,
American intellectual property law gives its de facto blessing to appropriation of the
intangible. It asserts that intangible cultural resources are fundamentally different
than tangible resources, when in fact “[b]oth are necessary for the continued survival
of Indian nations.”91 Moreover, intellectual property regimes have proven just as
likely to harm or reduce native interests in cultural property as to protect them. The
mismatch between these regimes and Native American understandings of creation
and ownership results in situations where "creative works that are unprotectable in
their cultural context often find copyright protection in the hands of non-Natives
when the latter use them in academic and commercial use."92 Consider the example
of Disney’s “He Mele No Lilo,” a 2002 single written for the movie Lilo & Stitch. The
song incorporates sacred Hawaiian naming chants, which cannot themselves be
copyrighted or generate royalties—but assuming that “He Mele No Lilo” is a workfor-hire, Disney is now entitled to royalties until 2097.93
Some commentators have suggested that “a sui generis intellectual property
law, which take[s] into account diverse interests of Native American peoples, may be
the most effective long-term solution for overcoming the pitfalls of the current
regime.”94 Such sui generis protection could mimic droit moral, or moral rights,
which are recognized by the European Union and understood to protect the
personality interests of an artist in her work. Under Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention, moral rights exist “[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and
even after the transfer of the said rights.”95 In France, “droit moral are perpetual and
exist for as long as the work survives in human memory.”96 A moral rights
framework could support Native American claims asserting the inalienability of
cultural resources, as well as a perpetual personality interest in those resources.
Koren Kelley argues that application of moral rights principles “would protect the
personality of the author(s), and perhaps more significantly, could justify an
extension in the protection given to cultural property due to the ‘community's
interest in the work, [rather than] the reputation of the artist.’”97 If such a
framework truly could protect communal, inalienable, and perpetual personality
interests in Native American art, it would be a significant improvement for tribes
over the current intellectual property regimes.
90 For further discussion of the forms that appropriation of Native American cultural resources
takes, see Tsosie, supra note 7, at 312.
91 Tsosie, supra note 7, at 306.
92 Amina Para Matlon, Safeguarding Native American Sacred Art by Partnering Tribal Law
and Equity: An Exploratory Case Study Applying the Bulun Bulun Equity to Navajo Sandpainting,
27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 216 (2004).
93 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2020).
94 Kelley, supra note 12, at 197 (proposing a moral rights framework). See also Riley, supra note
11, at 214–224 for an alternative proposal (with some moral-rights-esque elements) for an Indian
Copyright Act.
95 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Art, 6bis(1), July 24,
1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 222.
96 Kelley, supra note 12, at 198.
97 Kelley, supra note 12, at 201 (quoting Suzanne Milchan, Whose Rights are These Anyway? A
Rethinking of our Society's Intellectual Property Laws in Order to Better Protect Native American
Religious Property, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 157, 170 (2003)).
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Beyond the political difficulty of implementing such a moral rights regime,
however, any system of federal, sui generis intellectual property protection may be
ill-suited to combat unauthorized commercialization of intangible cultural resources.
As Stephen Osborne argues in Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization,
“[h]eavy-handed federal legislation might well destroy—or at least devalue—the very
resources it seeks to preserve.”98 Moral rights protections, for example, are often
justified by the belief that artists “infuse their creations with their experiences and
emotions . . . [as] creative geniuses.”99 Moral rights protect the artist’s personality
interest in a fixed product of her genius, even after she has transferred economic
rights. Communal moral rights could similarly grant tribes control over the fixed
products of their genius—but the requirement that these cultural resources be fixed
may turn moral rights into a double-edged sword. Asserting uniform intellectual
property protection for “stories, songs, and ceremonies creates the danger of
preserving a static ‘culture’ at the expense of a living one.”100 This danger could be
mitigated, as Angela Riley suggests in Straight Stealing: Towards an Indigenous
System of Cultural Property Protection, by deferring to tribal laws and customs for
designations of communal and/or inalienable cultural resources.101 Any federal
solution would need to strike a delicate balance recognizing tribal interests in
cultural resource protection without endorsing a “frozen-in-amber” ideal of the
cultural resources themselves.
Further discussion of the potential advantages and drawbacks of sui generis,
federal intellectual property protection is beyond the scope of this paper. It is worth
noting, however, that even if such legislation were unanimously agreed to be
desirable, the “blunt instrument of a uniform federal law” may take decades to
mobilize.102 Scholars disagree on the shape that this legislation should take103; tribes
may be justifiably hesitant to embrace additional federal involvement in
management of cultural resources.104 In the meantime, an enormous gap continues to
exist in the law for appropriation of intangible Native American cultural resources.
The following section explores a partial, state-based mechanism that could be used to
fill the gap: the right of publicity.

Osborne, supra note 6, at 207.
Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745,
1770 (2012).
100 Osborne, supra note 6, at 233.
101 Riley, supra note 3, at 86–91.
102 Osborne, supra note 6, at 234. See also Riley, supra note 3, at 73 (stating (in 2005) that
despite her support for the creation of federal laws protecting Native American cultural property, “it
does not appear likely that Congress will enact such legislation, at least not anytime in the near
future.”).
103 See, e.g., Riley, supra note 11, at 214–224 (outlining her proposal for an Indian Copyright
Act); Osborne, supra note 6, at 233 (advocating against uniform federal legislation); Kelley, supra
note 12 (advocating for moral rights protection).
104 See, e.g., Riley, supra note 3, at 87 (“Some scholars claim that extending Westernized
intellectual property rights to indigenous communities constitutes neo-colonialism, 98 in that it
simply borrows the language and methods of the oppressors and, in doing so, further empowers the
oppressors.”).
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IV. USING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TO COMBAT UNAUTHORIZED COMMERCIALIZATION
Many federally recognized tribes are already engaged in extensive cultural
resource preservation efforts.105 Federal law, however, provides no mechanism to
recognize or enforce tribal designations of communal and/or inalienable resources
against non-Indian appropriators.106 I argue that the right of publicity, properly
tailored, could be employed to provide Native communities with a legal claim and
remedy against appropriators—without subjecting those communities to additional
state or federal interference with cultural sovereignty. The following Part outlines
the right of publicity, its advantages for combatting unauthorized commercialization,
and how it could be implemented to protect Native American cultural resources at
common law or (preferably) in statute.
A. Background
The right of publicity in the United States developed as an offshoot of privacy
rights.107 As a result, it protects an interesting hybrid of property and privacy
interests—a hybrid that is well-suited to address the harms of cultural
appropriation. On one hand, courts have justified the right of publicity as a way to
prevent “unjust enrichment derived from the unauthorized commercial
misappropriation and exploitation of a celebrity's popularity.”108 This
characterization matches the definition of the right of publicity in the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition, which subjects an appropriator to liability only when
he has appropriated “the commercial value of a person’s identity . . . for purposes of
trade.”109 In this way, the right of publicity protects a celebrity’s right to generate
maximum commercial benefit from her person by preventing others from leeching off
profits—a similar strategy to that employed by IACA to protect tangible Native
American art. It is a property interest in the profits generated by one’s own persona,
which can be used to exclude imitators from the market.110
On the other hand, the right of publicity is articulated in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts primarily as a privacy right—a right that is invaded when an
individual “appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another.”111
This privacy right is “not limited to commercial appropriation,” and a plaintiff need
not be engaged in commercialization of her own identity to assert a right of publicity
Riley, supra note 3, at 102–109.
See, e.g., Riley, supra note 3, at 118 (discussing OutKast’s incorporation of a sacred Navajo
song into their Grammy performance. Even if the Navajo had passed a tribal ordinance declaring
that the song was community cultural property that could not be publicly performed or recorded,
only members of the tribe would be bound by the ordinance.).
107 DAVID TAN, THE COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF FAME 40 (2017); see also Corinna Coors,
Morality, Utility, Reality: Justifying Celebrity Rights in the 21st Century, 44 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 215, 230 (2017).
108 Coors, supra note 107, at 232.
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. L. INST. 1995).
110 In this way, the right of publicity employs a strategy to that used by IACA to prevent
imitation goods from crowding out the market for “authentic” Indian art.
111 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A, 652C (AM. L. INST. 1977).
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claim.112 Instead, a defendant may be found liable when he has “appropriated to his
own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public
interest or other values of the plaintiff's name or likeness.”113 The right of publicity
thus protects an individual’s right not to commercialize her image, and further to
prevent others from doing so. It recognizes “[a] celebrity's persona [as] a distinct
expression of one's self, which other persons should not be able to exploit
commercially without consent.”114 This privacy right exists “in the nature of a
property right” because it can be transferred and assigned to another, but it is
justified primarily by “the protection of [the individual’s] personal feelings against
mental distress.”115 The Restatement acknowledges that most invasions of this right
will be for “commercial purpose,” but clarifies that the right applies (unless modified
by statute) whenever “defendant makes use of the plaintiff's name or likeness for his
own purposes and benefit . . . [even when] the benefit sought to be obtained is not a
pecuniary one.”116
For Native American communities seeking to prevent cultural appropriation,
this combination of a property and privacy right—the right to reserve profits of
commercialization for themselves and the right to prevent commercialization
altogether—could be a powerful tool. The right of publicity, unlike other American
intellectual property rights, recognizes that unauthorized commercialization of
identity is, in and of itself, harmful. It offers “more comprehensive protection against
misappropriation than the law of copyright, for it can be used to prohibit the copying
of intangible as well as tangible expressions.”117 Although right of publicity suits
most often involve a celebrity plaintiff, right of publicity claims have historically been
available to celebrities and non-celebrities alike.118 Moreover, as Mark P. McKenna
asserts in ”The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition,” the right of
publicity for a non-celebrity is most compellingly justified by the plaintiff’s “interest
in autonomous self-determination . . . in controlling uses of her identity that affect
her ability to author that meaning.”119 Appropriation and unauthorized
commercialization of Native American cultural resources robs tribes of the ability to
author and control their own identity, to determine for themselves which aspects of
that identity are and are not for sale.120 The right of publicity evolved specifically to
protect this ability; it could be employed to help bolster the Native American
appropriation claims that Western intellectual property has for so long ignored.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977).
Id. § 652C cmt. b.
114 Coors, supra note 107, at 228 (citing Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property,
77 GEO. L.J. 287, 292 (1988) (Note that, in this way, the right of publicity is similar to droit moral)).
115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1977).
116 Id. § 652C cmt. b.
117 Howes, supra note 2, at 147.
118 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2020)
(defining the right of publicity as a “right inherent to everyone to control the commercial use of
identity and persona. . . .”).
119 Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 225, 279 (2005).
120 For further discussion of how cultural appropriation undermines cultural sovereignty, see
Tsosie, supra note 7, at 306–310.
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Expansion of the right of publicity in the context of entertainment law has
been met with substantial criticism. In fact, it is difficult “to find a property right
more vilified in the legal academy than the right of publicity.”121 Critics justly point
out the manner in which the right of publicity “confer[s] a source of additional wealth
on athletes and entertainers who are already very handsomely compensated,”122 and
worse, “strengthen[s] the already potent grip of the culture industries over the
production and circulation of meaning.”123
High-profile right of publicity suits typically pit an established, wealthy
celebrity (or her estate) against less-powerful or up-and-coming artists.124
Consequently, “[m]uch right of publicity litigation could . . . be characterized as
abusive in nature—plaintiffs bringing claims where there are no real damages or
significant non-economic damages, either as rent-seekers or to send a ‘message’
regarding boundary intrusion on a property right.”125 As it exists now, the right of
publicity frequently redistributes upward. The additional property and privacy
interests it protects are most often litigated by the already-wealthy, who in turn
receive “the capacity to chill expression and reduce the public domain.”126
That the right of publicity has been abused by already-entrenched and
powerful groups, however, does not justify denying its protection to other groups that
the law has left behind. Upward redistribution and cultural lock-in are far from
unique to the right of publicity: they exist, in some form, in every American
intellectual property regime. In “Copynorms, Black Cultural Production, and the
Debate over African-American Reparations,” K. J. Green recounts how “[t]he
structure of copyright law, grafted upon broad and pervasive social discrimination,
resulted in the widespread denial of copyright protection to black music artists.”127
He argues that anti-piracy amendments to the Copyright Act should be used as an
opportunity for the industry “to atone for its past injustices to Black artists” and
adopt a new set of “copynorms.”128 Green cites Native Americans as another “outsider
group” that has suffered from mass cultural appropriation and could benefit from
additional, atonement-driven intellectual property protection.129 Existing gaps in
intellectual property and cultural resource law do not simply under-protect Native
American cultural resources: they are also an affirmative part of the system that
makes appropriation of cultural resources by outsiders profitable. So far as the right
of publicity has already proven to be an effective redistribution mechanism, it may be

121 Mark Bartholomew, A Right Is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44
CONN. L. REV. 301, 303 (2011).
122 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,
81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 137 (1993).
123 Id. at 141.
124 See, e.g., ETW Corporation v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (pitting
artist Rick Rush against the licensing agent for golfer Tiger Woods).
125 K. J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, the Bad, and the Right of Publicity,
11 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 535 (2008).
126 Id. at 543
127 K. J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over AfricanAmerican Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1200 (2008).
128 Id. at 1222.
129 Id. at 1218 n. 256 (citing Tsosie, supra note 7).
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exactly the tool that Native Americans need to reclaim control over cultural
resources.
B. Right of Publicity at Common Law
Several scholars have already identified the right of publicity as a potential
avenue to protect Native American cultural property.130 However, the common law
elements of the right of publicity—which vary across jurisdictions—pose substantial
challenges for Native American communities to state a claim and demonstrate legally
cognizable harm. These challenges do not mean that the common law right of
publicity should be abandoned as a mechanism to protect Native American cultural
resources. They do mean, though, that a statutory right of publicity (as discussed
below) could be better tailored to address the harms of cultural appropriation for
Native communities.
Challenges for Native American communities asserting a common law right
of publicity begin with the various legal standards used to define the right. Some
states, like New York, simply do not recognize a common law right of publicity.131
Others recognize a common law right of publicity of limited duration: in Wisconsin,
for example, the right is only available during the lifetime of the plaintiff.132 Many
states have adopted some version of the common law invasion of privacy tort,133 but
its relationship to the right of publicity—especially when a right of publicity statute
is in play—can be murky.134 Moreover, even the broad right of publicity outlined in
Section 652(C) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts protects “the interest of the
individual in the exclusive use of his own identity.”135 The right of publicity has been
extended (in the statutory context) to groups, on the basis that “[a] group that
develops market value in its persona should be as entitled as an individual to
publicity rights in its name.”136 Extending the right of publicity to an entire
community, however, would require a significant doctrinal leap by the courts—a leap
without much foundation in current case law.

See Howes, supra note 2; Herrera, supra note 5.
Stephano v. News Group Publications, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183 (1984).
132 Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis.2d 379, 397–98, (1979); Heinz v. Frank Lloyd
Wright Foundation, 85-C-482-C, 1986 WL 5996, at *7 (W.D.Wis. Feb.24, 1986).
133 See REPORTERS NOTE FOR RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. L. INST. 1977)
(“The tort action for invasion of the right of privacy, in one form or another, is presently recognized
in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and
West Virginia. It has also been recognized by a federal court in Minnesota.”).
134 See Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of Dignitary Torts, 104 CORNELL
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2018)
(manuscript
at
23–39),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3150483 (for further discussion of the historical
development of invasion of privacy torts (and their uncertain relationship to other dignitary torts)).
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. L. INST. 1977).
136 Bi-Rite Enterprises v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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Potential applications of the common law right of publicity for Native
American communities faced with cultural appropriation can be more clearly
illustrated by use of a state-specific example. California, a recognized leader in
common law right of publicity protection, employs a four-element test for a common
law claim:
The elements of a right-to-publicity claim under California common
law are:
(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity;
(2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s
advantage, commercially or otherwise;
(3) lack of consent; and
(4) resulting injury.137
Consider a hypothetical appropriation analogous to Disney’s 2002
incorporation of sacred Native Hawaiian name chants in Lilo and Stitch (discussed
above). This time (to avoid jurisdictional problems) we will say that Disney used
sacred chants unique to a Native Californian tribe. The tribe sued for injunctive
relief in California state court, asserting an irreparable harm if its sacred chants are
exposed to the world and trivialized by Disney. To survive a motion to dismiss, the
tribe would need to plausibly plead each of the four elements of the California
common law right of publicity claim.138
First, the tribe would have to establish that Disney’s appropriation of the
sacred chant was, in fact, a “use of plaintiff’s identity.”139 Generally speaking, the
personal attributes protected by the right of publicity are broad: they can include “‘a
person's nickname, signature, physical pose, characterizations, singing style, vocal
characteristics, [distinctive] body parts, frequently used phrases, car, performance
style, mannerisms and gestures,’ and even expressions which are merely associated
with the claimant.”140 If a “singing style” can be protected by the right of publicity,
why not a specific, identifiable religious chant? The problem for the tribe is twofold.
It must convince the court not only that the specific chant or chants should be a
protected attribute of the tribe’s identity, but that the tribe’s identity should be a
protected “identity” in the first place. California courts have never recognized a
communal right to publicity (nor have any other state courts, for that matter). To
succeed, then, the tribe will have to convince the court to accept a novel claim about a
communal privacy/property right.

137 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1273 n. 4
(9th Cir. 2013).
138 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
139 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1273 n. 4.
140 Howes, supra note 2, at 147.
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Substantial support for this claim exists if the court is willing to look outside
the realm of state right of publicity precedent. As Jessica Herrera notes in “Not Even
His Name: Is the Denigration of Crazy Horse Custer's Final Revenge?,” “American
Indian law has long recognized communal property interests.”141 The tribe could ask
the court to look to tribal law and custom as it decides whether the tribe’s communal
identity 1) should possess legally recognized privacy/property rights, and 2) should
include, as a protected attribute, sacred chants. Recognition of tribal law by AngloAmerican courts is rare, but not unheard of.142 In Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson,
for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals referenced an Artifacts Ordinance
passed by the Tlingit people as the basis of the Chilkat Indian Village’s proprietary
interest in a set of sacred artifacts.143 In Natural Arch and Bridge Society v. Alston,
the United States District Court for Utah included substantial discussion of Navajo
customary law in its opinion upholding the National Park Service’s management
plan for the Rainbow Bridge National Monument.144 Angela Riley, author of
“Straight Stealing: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection,”
urges tribes to develop and clarify their standards for cultural resource preservation,
arguing that “non-Indian courts may look to the moral authority of tribal law to
broaden their conceptions of indigenous justice and non-Western ownership.”145 If the
tribe in our hypothetical appropriation case had clear standards governing public
performance of sacred chants, it could compellingly argue that California state courts
should consider—and defer to—tribal custom.
The tribe could also turn to federal law to bolster its claim of communal
property rights in cultural resources. Specifically, NAGPRA’s “acknowledgment of a
communal right to certain resources central to Native American culture provides one
legal toehold for constructing a protective scheme not predicated . . . . on individual
creativity and ownership.”146 NAGPRA defines “cultural patrimony” as “an object
having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native
American group or culture itself . . . which, therefore, cannot be alienated,
appropriated, or conveyed by any individual.”147 It defines “cultural affiliation” as “a
relationship of shared group identity which can be reasonably traced historically or
prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization
and an identifiable earlier group.”148 In short, NAGPRA recognizes that some Native
American cultural resources are inalienable, communal property, and it defers to
tribal custom to establish those particular resources.149 NAGPRA, moreover, is not
the only federal law to recognize inalienable, communal resources for Native

141 Herrera, supra note 5, at 190 (citing John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property:
Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179 (1989)).
142 Riley, supra note 3, at 124.
143 Chilkat Indian Villange v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1470 (9th Cir. 1989).
144 Natural Arch and Bridge Society v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1209–15 (D. Utah 2002).
145 Riley, supra note 3, at 129.
146 Osborne, supra note 6, at 219.
147 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (3)(D) (2020).
148 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2) (2020).
149 Osborne, supra note 6, at 219–220.
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American communities: the Indian Child Welfare Act explicitly created a communal
right to the “resource” of Indian children.150
Finding support for communal identity and property interests in tribal and
federal law, however, is a far cry from establishing those interests in state law.
Recognition of tribal law by state courts remains nonexistent in most states, and it is
unclear how and whether the language of ICWA or NAGPRA—both of which apply to
tangible cultural resources—ought to be employed in the context of the common law
right of publicity. Even if our hypothetical tribe is able to convince a California court
that Disney had engaged in a “use of [the tribe’s] identity,” it would still have to
demonstrate that the appropriation worked to Disney’s advantage, that the tribe did
not consent to the use, and that the resulting injury would be severe enough to justify
injunctive relief (or, failing that, money damages).151 Here, the tribe would likely be
confronted with the same set of Anglo-American assumptions about individual,
profit-motivated creators and acceptable artistic “borrowing” that drive the current
gap in law. Some Native communities, specifically those in states that already
recognize a strong, common law right of publicity, may be able to clear these
hurdles—but others will be left with weak or non-existent common law claims.
Before moving on to discuss the benefits of a statutory right of publicity, it is
worth emphasizing that there are far stronger versions of a common law right of
publicity claim than the hypothetical discussed above. Melissa Shaginoff recalls a
memorable experience in which, during a visit to Times Square in New York City,
she looked up to see an advertisement for a “Yu’pik Parka” flashing across one of the
digital screens.152 The coat pictured, of course, was not an actual Yu’pik Parka; the
Yu’pik name was used as a part of the advertisement, an ‘exotic’ label for the jacket
intended to attract a customer’s eye. This use lies at the intersection of all three
harms of cultural appropriation identified at the start of the Article: it undercuts the
ability of the Yu’pik to market authentic parkas if they so choose; it erases the Yu’pik
as a living, breathing community by reducing their name to a decontextualized coat
label; and it exploits white fascination with Native words and names to market an
object. As Ms. Shaginoff states, “Sometimes all we have is our name . . . and the fact
that somebody could use it to sell a coat is pretty discouraging.”153 The right of
publicity, even in its most bare-bones, common-law form, evolved to protect the
integrity of names. Commercial exploitation of the specific name of a Native
community without the community’s consent provides, in this author’s opinion, a
clear and strong common-law right of publicity claim.

150 Osborne, supra note 6, at 230 (“Congress in ICWA [the Indian Child Welfare Act] created a
communal right in that "resource" [of Indian children].”).
151 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1273 n. 4.
152 While Ms. Shaginoff does not recall the specific name of the company whose advertisement
she saw, an online search reveals at least one major jacket-making company that sells a purportedly
“Yu’pik Parka.” See https://www.fjallraven.com/us/en-us/men/jackets/parkas/yupik-parka-m.
153 Shaginoff, supra note 22.
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C. Right of Publicity Statutes
Many states currently employ a statutory right of publicity, either in addition
to154 or preempting155 the common law right. The clearest advantage of such statutes
is that they allow the state legislature to make—and if necessary, alter—specific
policy judgements about the reach and remedies that the right of publicity should
offer. In Arkansas, for example, the right of publicity protects an “individual's name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness”156 and offers, as exclusive remedies,
“damages and disgorgement of profits, funds, goods, or services.”157 Arkansas also
codifies a set of exemptions to the right of publicity, including qualified uses “[i]n
connection with a news, public affairs, or sports broadcast, including the promotion of
and advertising for a sports broadcast, an account of public interest, or a political
campaign” and some educational uses.158 Critics of the right of publicity often assert
that it infringes on First Amendment freedoms, or at least chills valuable creative
expression.159 Statutory exemptions offer state legislatures (and other involved
parties) an opportunity to weigh and address possible disadvantages of right of
publicity protection, and further to direct chilling effects toward activity that the
state wants to chill—like cultural appropriation.
A statutory right of publicity protecting intangible Native American cultural
resources would need to possess several core characteristics. First, the right of
publicity must empower Native communities to decide for themselves which cultural
resources should, in fact, be protected attributes of their identity, lest the solution
fall victim to the same sort of cultural imperialism that has helped produce the
status quo. Second, the right of publicity must explicitly belong to Native
communities, rather than individuals, so that a community has standing to assert its
claim. Third, the right of publicity must be available regardless of whether a Native
community has previously commercialized, or intends to commercialize, attributes of
its shared identity; otherwise, it could not be effectively employed to prevent
commercialization. Finally, the right of publicity must be available as long as the
community endures—it cannot be limited, as many state rights of publicity are, by
the lifetime of a particular author.
A right of publicity statute could meet these four criteria in a number of
ways, and should be shaped by the distinct needs and preferences of Native
communities in the state. Existing right of publicity statutes demonstrate that this
kind of tailoring is possible. Arizona and Louisiana, for example, have right of
publicity statutes designed to exclusively protect soldiers.160 South Dakota goes so far

See, e.g., California’s statutory right of publicity at CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3344 (2016).
See, e.g., Illinois’ statutory right of publicity at 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/1-60 (2020).
156 ARK. CODE § 4-75-1104 (2016).
157 Id. §§ 4-75-1111, 4-75-1108.
158 Id. § 4-75-1110.
159 See, e.g., David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser: How Arnold
Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity to Terminate Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651, 665–666 (2005); Alex Vlisides, Video Games and NCAA Athletes:
Resolving a Modern Threat to the First Amendment, 45 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 24 (2015).
160 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-761, 13-3726 (2020); LA. STAT. § 14:102.21 (2020).
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as to protect an individual’s distinct gesture or mannerism.161 The possibility that
tribes in a particular state may not have developed clear standards for cultural
resource management should not be a barrier to a right of publicity statute enabling
future claims. Just as “[t]he 1990 passage of NAGPRA likely inspired tribes to
address the issue of burial grounds,” state right of publicity legislation could inspire
tribes to address and clarify standards for appropriate use of intangible cultural
resources.162 These standards could be established through historical records, tribal
codes or ordinances, tribal customary law, and other sources.163 In “The Tipi With
Battle Pictures: The Kiowa Tradition of Intangible Property Rights,” Candace Greene
and Thomas Drescher outline a long history of intangible property rights passed
down orally in the Kiowa tribe. Although it is difficult to imagine a state court
applying Kiowa law in a right of publicity case,164 a state court could cite this history
as compelling evidence that the Kiowa consider the Tipi with Battle Pictures to be an
inalienable attribute of their communal identity—and that any reasonable
appropriator would have known this to be the case.
An enormous advantage of a statutory right is that the decision to bring suit
is always elective; a right of publicity statute could empower Native communities to
assert appropriation claims without imposing any kind of state or federal regulation.
Currently, tribal courts’ inability to assert jurisdiction over non-Indian appropriators
means that, no matter how clear and developed a tribe’s standards for cultural
resource management may be, those standards will struggle to combat large-scale
appropriation. A right of publicity statute would open the door for tribes to bring
appropriation claims in state courts, which are far better-equipped to assert
jurisdiction over defendants across the nation and the world. By encouraging state
courts to defer to tribal designations of communal property and identity, a right of
publicity statute could further serve to combat the risk of cultural lock-in, as
“[t]ribally formulated laws governing the protection of traditional knowledge are free
to evolve outside the constraints of Anglo-American intellectual property doctrine.”165
Such legislation would simultaneously provide much-need legal remedy for
appropriation and “reinforce[ tribes’] status as independent, self-governing
entities . . . [and] stewards of their own destiny.”166
V. CONCLUSION
For too long, gaps in American intellectual property law and federal cultural
resource protection have left intangible Native American cultural resources without
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-64-1 (2020).
Riley, supra note 3, at 115.
163 Tribes may not choose to codify customary laws for a number of reasons. For discussion, see
Riley, supra note 3, at 97.
164 See, e.g., Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999) (Application of
tribal law outside of tribal court is extremely rare. This author is aware of only one example in
which federal law requires that tribal law be applied: when an FTCA claim is made for injury
occurring on tribal land.).
165 Riley, supra note 3, at 91.
166 Riley, supra note 3, at 120.
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legal protection. The results of this oversight are clear: appropriation remains both
profitable and legally permissible, and Native communities have no legal remedy
against outside appropriators. Proposals for sui generis, federal protection face
significant political and normative hurdles. Rather than rely on the remote (and
potentially undesirable) possibility of federal legislation, this Article outlines a case
for the state-based right of publicity as a potential tool to empower Native
communities to successfully assert appropriation claims.
The right of publicity is far from a perfect solution to the problem of cultural
appropriation. Like the rest of Anglo-American intellectual property law, the common
law right of publicity remains individualistic in focus. Even a statutory right of
publicity raises First Amendment concerns and would undoubtedly pose political
challenges. Still, the unique hybrid of privacy and property interests that the right of
publicity protects is well-suited to recognize and remedy the harms of cultural
appropriation. A well-crafted right of publicity statute would provide a valuable
opportunity for state courts to recognize and defer to tribal law and custom. Most
importantly, the right of publicity could provide legal remedy to Native communities
where no remedy currently exists. Future research and scholarship should engage
directly with Native American artists, leaders, and advocates on the specific forms
that a right of publicity statute could and should take.

